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Natural disasters can be extremely disruptive to farmers and to others whose 
incomes depend on a successful crop.  Society can gain from more efficient sharing of 
crop and natural disaster risks.  However, the costs associated with traditional agricultural 
risk programs have historically exceeded the gains from improved risk sharing.  This 
paper explores government intervention in agricultural risk markets and discusses new 
approaches to risk sharing with limited government involvement. In particular, we build 
the case for introducing negotiable state-contingent contracts settled on area crop yield 
estimates or locally appropriate weather indices.  These instruments could replace 
traditional crop insurance at a lower cost to government while meeting the risk 
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 NEW APPROACHES TO CROP YIELD INSURANCE IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
 





Agricultural production is inherently a risky business, and farmers face a variety 
of weather, pest, disease, input supply and market related risks. Given an uncertain 
income each year, farmers must worry about their ability to repay debt, to meet overhead 
costs (e.g. land rents and taxes) and, in many cases, their ability to meet essential living 
costs for their families.  These same risks are also of concern to agricultural lending 
institutions. Confronted with risky borrowers, lenders must seek to reduce the possibility 
of poor loan recovery rates in unfavorable years, even if this means only modest levels of 
lending to agriculture. 
The prevalence of risk in agriculture is not new and farmers, rural institutions and 
lenders have, over generations, developed ways of reducing and coping with risk. 
Although the virtues of these traditional risk management mechanisms are widely 
recognized (see, for example, Hazell, Pomareda, and Valdes), they also have their 
limitations.  They can be costly in terms of the income opportunities that farmers forego 
(e.g. crop diversification is typically less profitable than specialization).  They can  
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discourage investments and technological changes that, while risky, enhance long-term 
productivity growth.  And they have limited capacity to spread covariate risks like 
droughts that affect most farmers in a region at the same time. In theory, these limitations 
would not exist if capital and insurance markets were perfect, but the reality for many 
risky agricultural regions in developing countries is quite the opposite; relevant capital 
and insurance markets are poorly developed and they are weakly linked across regions 
and with urban areas. 
Arrow and Debreu long ago addressed the value of risk sharing markets for 
society.  Failures in agricultural insurance markets provide a rationale for governmental 
intervention, providing governments can fix the problem at lower cost than the social 
benefits derived.  And governments of all hue and color around the world have intervened 
with a range of risk management programs for farmers (crop insurance, price 
stabilization, drought relief, livestock feed subsidies, etc).  Most have proved an expensive 
drain on the public purse, and there is little evidence to show that these interventions have 
generated any sizeable social benefits, or that the benefits exceed their costs.  By the same token, 
crop and natural disaster relief can have profound redistributional impacts in smaller countries.  
For many small countries, such government assistance can be extremely costly and may 
represent a high percentage of GNP when the disaster is large.  This can have serious 
consequences for the monetary and fiscal policies of small countries. 
This paper focuses on production risks, and reviews the experience with public 
crop insurance programs.  Recognizing their inherent limitations and inability to help 
many of the rural poor, some simple area-based index insurance options are proposed that 
could replace crop insurance, and at the same time satisfy the risk management needs of a 3 
 
much wider clientele or rural dwellers.  Extension of the approach could also address 
other important insurance needs, especially against price and market risks. Recent 
developments with financial market instruments for spreading catastrophic risks have 
increased the opportunities for the kinds of index insurance proposed in this paper. 2. THE EXPERIENCE WITH PUBLIC CROP INSURANCE 
PROGRAMS 
Publicly provided crop yield insurance has been implemented in many developed 
and developing countries (Hazell, Pomareda, and Valdes).  These crop insurance 
programs are generally multiple peril or all risk programs, meaning that the insurance 
compensates all yield losses, regardless of cause. Although insured hazards are often 
enumerated, the lists of covered hazards are so comprehensive that uninsured hazards 
cannot be excluded in practice, including losses from bad management. Indemnities are 
typically based on the difference between actual yield and a pre-specified target yield, not 
on actual crop damage or input costs lost. Setting the target yield can be difficult, as one must 
either base the target on a short history of yields for each farmer or accept the farmer’s 
declaration of his/her potential yield.  Most programs attempt to compute an average or expected 
yield and then guarantee some percentage of the value. Most programs include deductibles, so as 
to help control for adverse selection and moral hazard.  In many countries insurance is tied to 
loans from an agricultural development bank (ADB), with the bank paying the premium and 
collecting the indemnities.  In some countries the insurance is compulsory for all farmers 
growing the insured crops or borrowing from the ADB.  
RESULTS 
The financial experience with publicly provided, multiple-peril crop insurance has 
been disastrous. In all cases, programs are heavily subsidized and governments not only 
pay part of the premium, but also most of the delivery and service costs, and they cover 2 
 
aggregate losses even when the losses exceed targeted levels over long periods of time. In 
order to be profitable, a purely private insurer would have to structure contracts so that 
premiums collected exceed the average payouts (indemnities plus administrative costs).  
Hazell quantifies the condition for sustainable insurance as follows: 
 (A + I )/ P < 1 
where  A = average administrative costs 
    =  average indemnities paid 
            P  = average premiums paid 
Hazell reports experience with public crop insurance programs in seven countries 
(Table 1).  The loss ratio exceeds 2 in every case.  Two extremes are noteworthy: in 
Brazil the ratio of indemnities to premiums is very high while the ratio of administrative 
cost to premiums was relatively low; while in Japan the situation is reversed.  The lesson 
to be drawn is clear: one must invest a great deal in administrative cost and monitoring 
before having a crop insurance program that will be actuarially sound. 
 
Table 1  Financial performance of crop insurance programs in seven countries 
Country  Period  I/P  A/P  (A+I)/P 
         
Brazil  75-81  4.29  0.28  4.57 
Costa Rica  70-89  2.26  0.54  2.80 
India   85-89  5.11  na  na 
Japan  47-77  1.48  1.17  2.60 
  85-89  0.99  3.57  4.56 
Mexico   80-89  3.18  0.47  3.65 
Philippines  81-89  3,94  1.80  5.74  




The ratio I/ P measures the average return to farmers’ own investment in the 
insurance; i.e. the number of dollars received on average per dollar of premium they pay 
from their own pocket. Apart from Japan, most farmers appear to make a killing from 
crop insurance, receiving two to four times as much money back as they pay in. 
Surprisingly, they still don’t line up to buy it and it typically has to be made compulsory. 
A likely reason for this is adverse selection.  Because farmers are often grouped into risk 
categories when the premium rates are calculated, but receive benefits that are tailored to 
their individual losses, then farmers in each group facing lower than average risks may 
end up paying too much for the average benefits they receive.  But sometimes farmers are 
reluctant to buy insurance even when it is profitable because they can expect to receive 
alternative payments from the government in catastrophic years without paying any 
premium up front (e.g. emergency drought relief programs).  The I/P ratios reported 
above are unlikely to have improved in more recent years.  Indeed, Mishra reports that 
India’s I/P ratio increased to 6.1 for the period 1985-94, and Skees (1999a) reports that 
the U.S. program has an expected I/P of 4 for 1999. 
Despite these high costs, there is little evidence to show that crop insurance has 
had any positive impacts on agricultural lending, agricultural production or farm income. 
For example, social cost-benefit analyses of the Mexican and Japanese schemes show 
negligible social returns in relation to their high costs (Bassoco et al and Tsujii). 
Pomareda found that a small increase in interest rates would have been just as beneficial 
to the ADB in Panama as the compulsory crop insurance program for its borrowers.  Crop 
insurance, when heavily subsidized, can even have important negative social impacts. 
Subsidies for risk management have similar effects as subsidies on any other farm input; 4 
 
it encourages over use. And since the reduction in production costs is partly paid for by 
the subsidy, the dead weight loss of the subsidy is always greater than the combined 
benefits to producers and consumers (Siamwalla and Valdes).  In practice, this implies 
that risk management subsidies reduce risk costs to farmers to below their true social 
value, leading to excessive risk taking (e.g. growing unsuitable crops in high risk regions) 
and increased exposure to future drought losses by the farmer.   
Subsidies not only create dependence on future drought assistance from the 
government, but also lower social welfare.  Kunreuther and Kaplow demonstrate how 
such assistance sends the wrong signals for hurricanes and earthquakes.  The implication 
is that, wherever possible, government interventions should be limited to risk 
management programs that decision-makers pay for themselves.  Finally, crop insurance 
has at best helped farmers who grow insured crops, and it is of no assistance to many 
other rural dwellers whose livelihoods are also impacted by catastrophic agricultural 
production and income outcomes (e.g. landless laborers, agricultural traders and 
processors, farm input suppliers, and rural shopkeepers). 
REASONS FOR FAILURE 
Why has public crop insurance failed so badly?  One of the most important 
reasons is that many of the risks covered by multiple risk insurance are inherently 
uninsurable, leading to large actuarial losses for the insurer.  Vaughan reviews many of 
the conditions for insurance markets.  An insurable risk has the following four 
characteristics:  
1. The likelihood of the event must be readily quantifiable;  5 
 
2. The damage it causes must be easy to attribute and value;  
3. The probability of occurrence should not be too high to make the insurance 
unaffordable; and 
4. Neither the occurrence of the event or the damage it causes should be affected 
by the insured’s behavior (i.e. no moral hazard).   
While the traditional insurance literature list a fifth characteristic (i.e., 
independent risk), many catastrophic risks that are co-variate are now insured by private 
markets (e.g. hurricanes, typhoons, earthquakes, floods).  Private insurance companies 
typically do not insure yield losses due to pest and diseases, and prefer to write insurance 
against specific and insurable perils; it is rare to see a private company that writes 
multiple risk or all risk insurance, and the ones that have had had very short lives. 
Another important reason for failure in agricultural insurance is that public 
insurers are often mandated to extend their insurance to small farms, and this can add 
enormously to administration costs. By the same token, programs that offer contracts on a 
field-by-field basis (as in the U.S.) are also expensive to administer.  
A third reason for failure is that inappropriate incentive problems arise within insurance 
institutions when the government underwrites most of their programs.  When insurers know that 
the government will automatically cover most losses, they have little incentive to pursue sound 
insurance practices when assessing losses.  In fact, they may find it profitable to collude with 
farmers in filing exaggerated or falsified claims.  Hazell reports that in Mexico prior to closing 
the national agricultural insurance agency, it was not uncommon for inspectors to receive bribes 
of about 30 percent of the value of the indemnity payments made to farmers.  When the insurer 
underwrites the loans of an ADB, these incentive problems can easily infect the bank too, leading 6 
 
to a serious loss of discipline in banking practices.  Why, for example, should ADB staff try to 
collect loans from tardy borrowers if they can more easily obtain repayment from the 
insurer? 
Another common reason for failure has been that governments undermine public 
insurers for political reasons.  Hazell gives examples where insurers have had to pay out against 
exaggerated losses in election years.  In the U.S., the government has repeatedly undermined its 
crop insurance program by providing direct assistance to producers in disaster areas (Goodwin 
and Smith; Skees, 1999a).  Why should farmers purchase crop insurance against major 
calamities (including drought) if they know that farm lobbies can usually apply the necessary 
political pressure to obtain direct assistance for them in times of need at no financial cost? 
Many crop insurance programs also tend to be too specialized, focusing on 
specific crops, regions and types of farmers, particularly when the insurance is tied to the 
loans of an ADB that has a mandate to serve particular target groups identified by the 
government.  Without a well-diversified insurance portfolio, crop insurers are susceptible 
to covariability problems, and face the prospect of sizeable losses in some years.  Since 
public insurers are rarely able to obtain commercial insurance or contingent loan 
arrangements, this specialization increases their dependence on the government. 
Guidelines for Improving Government Sponsored Insurance 
Publicly owned crop insurance programs are probably impossible to design as 
sustainable financial entities without some level of government support if they are to 
continue to reach intended target groups. However, the following principles for sound 
insurance could lead to considerable improvement in performance in most cases. 7 
 
1. Make the insurer responsible for its own financial affairs, and deny it 
automatic access to government funds when they incur losses. Subsidies are 
not necessarily ruled out, particularly for important target groups, but they 
should be fixed in advance on a pro-rated basis. 
2. Only insure “insurable” risks to the maximum extent possible, e.g. specific 
perils like hail damage. Where moral hazard cannot be avoided, then use 
deductibles and other co-insurance arrangements. 
3. Premiums should be based on sound, actuarial calculations, and adjusted over 
time to reflect actual loss payments. 
4. The insurer should develop a rational insurance portfolio for managing risk, 
and should not be tied rigidly to the lending portfolio of an agricultural 
development bank.  They should be required to purchase realistic levels of re-
insurance in the national or international insurance markets.  
5. The insurance should be voluntary and in competition with the private sector. 
6. To avoid adverse selection, premium rates should be tailored to the indemnity 
payments that individual farmers receive, to the largest extent possible. 
7. Administrative costs must be controlled. 
Commercial insurers rigorously adhere to such principles, not least because they 
know that the government is unlikely to bail them out should they incur large losses. 
Even so, the volume of private crop insurance is not trivial.  Gudger estimated total 
premium income at about $1 billion per year, and it seems to have grown since then.  The 
drawback is that private insurance is almost exclusively sold to large-scale, commercial 
farmers growing high value crops.  If public crop insurance were operated strictly along 8 
 
the same principles, it would not be able to serve many of the medium- to smaller-sized 
farms that are the traditional targets of government assistance programs. 
The situation is similar to the experience with the reform of rural financial 
markets.  As financial markets are liberalized and banks become more efficient and 
financially sound, they also become less willing to lend to small-scale farmers. In the 
finance case, the lending vacuum for small borrowers has been filled by an explosion of 
agencies offering microfinance.  Microfinace is not only reaching many of the small-scale 
farmers previously targeted by ADBs, but it is also reaching many other kinds of small-
scale borrowers who were previously ignored by formal lending institutions. As more 
governments begin to reform their agricultural insurance markets, and to set their insurers 
on a financially sound basis, the same kind of service vacuum seems likely to emerge for 
small scale farmers.  As yet, the insurance equivalent of microfinance has not emerged, 
but is clearly needed to reach both small-scale farmers and other rural dwellers that are 
impacted by catastrophic weather events.  We turn now to some new developments in 
insurance that offers not only “micro-insurance” possibilities for the poor, but which could also 
be attractive to large farms and many other commercial enterprises in rural areas. 9 
 
3. NEW APPROACHES TO INSURANCE: USING INDEX AND AREA-
BASED CONTRACTS TO INSURE NATURAL DISASTERS 
What is needed is a system of insurance that meets the following requirements: 
1. It is affordable and accessible to all kinds of rural people, including the poor. 
2. It compensates for catastrophic income losses to protect consumption and debt 
repayment capacity. 
3. It is practical to implement given the limited kinds of data available. 
4. It can be provided by the private sector with little or no government subsidies. 
5. It avoids the moral hazard and adverse selection problems that have bedeviled 
crop insurance programs. 
Area-based index contracts, such as regional rainfall (and other weather) 
insurance could meet all these requirements. 
The essential principle of area-based index insurance is that contracts are written 
against specific perils or events (e.g. area yield loss, drought, or flood) defined and 
recorded at a regional level (e.g. at a local weather station).  Insurance is sold in standard 
units (e.g. $10 or $100), with a standard contract (certificate) for each unit purchased 
called a Standard Unit Contract (SUC).  The premium rate for a SUC is the same for all 
buyers who buy the same contract in a given region, and all buyers receive the same 
indemnity per SUC if the insured event occurs. Buyers are free to purchase as many units 
of the insurance as they wish.  
Area-based crop yield insurance is a good example of such a scheme. In this case 
the insurance is written against the average yield for a region (e.g. a county or district), 
and a payment is made whenever the measured yield for the region falls below some pre-10 
 
defined limit (say 80 percent of normal).  Such schemes already exist in the US, India, 
Sweden, and the Canadian province of Quebec (Miranda; Mishra; Skees, Black, and 
Barnett).  In the U.S., the Group Risk Plan uses county yields to trigger a payment, and 
coverage up to 90 percent of the county yield is available.  Payments are made based on 
the protection (liability) selected by the farmer and the percentage below the trigger yield 
(coverage times the expected county yield).  Since county yield data are available for long 
periods of time, adjustments to the trigger yield are made for technical advances.   
Area-based yield insurance requires long and reliable series of area-yield data, and 
this kind of data is not available in many countries. Hence alternative indices may be 
more attractive, such as area rainfall or soil moisture indexes.  Rainfall and soil moisture 
contracts could effectively protect against crop losses due to drought or excess rainfall.  
Improved ground instruments coupled with satellite and remote sensing technologies 
make measuring rainfall and soil moisture less expensive than in years past.  These 
technologies can also be used to add credibility to the measurement so that those outside 
the country have confidence in the numbers.   
Area-based index insurance has a number of attractive features: 
• Because buyers in a region pay the same premium and receive the same 
indemnity per SUC, it avoids all adverse selection problems.  Moreover, the 
insured’s management decisions after planting a crop will not be influenced 
by the index contract, eliminating moral hazard.  A farmer with rainfall 
insurance possesses the same economic incentives to produce a profitable a 
crop as the uninsured farmer. 11 
 
• It could be very inexpensive to administer, since there are no individual 
contracts to write, no on-farm inspections, and no individual loss assessments.  It 
uses only data on a single regional index, and this can be based on data that is 
available and generally reliable.  It is also easy to market; SUCs could be sold rather 
like travelers' checks or lottery tickets, and presentation of the certificate would 
be sufficient to claim a payment when one is due. 
• The insurance can be sold to anyone.  Purchasers need not be farmers, nor 
even have to live or work in the region.  The insurance should be attractive to 
anybody whose income is correlated with the insured event, including agricultural 
traders and processors, input suppliers, banks, shopkeepers, and laborers.  Defining 
SUCs in small denominations would raise their appeal to poor people. 
• It would be easy for the private sector to run, and might even provide an entry 
point for private insurers to develop other kinds of insurance products for 
rural people.  For example, once an area-based index removes much of the 
co-variate risk, an insurer can wrap individual coverage around such a policy 
to handle independent risk (i.e., certain situations where the individual has a 
loss and does not receive a payment from the area-based index).  
• As long as the insurance is voluntary and unsubsidized, it will only be 
purchased when it is a less expensive or more effective alternative to existing 
risk management strategies.   
• A secondary market for insurance certificates could emerge that would enable 
people to cash in the tradable value of a SUC at any time. 12 
 
• Recent developments in micro-finance also make area-based index insurance 
an increasingly viable proposition for helping poor people better manage risk. 
The same borrowing groups established for micro-finance could be used as a 
conduit for selling index insurance, either to the group as a whole, or to 
individuals who might wish to insure their loans. 
A key question is whether the insurance would prove attractive to individuals. An 
index product should be more affordable than individual insurance, particularly if 
government does not subsidize either.  Moreover, by offering an index contract that removes 
most of the systemic correlated risk that an individual faces, he/she only faces independent risks 
that may more easily be insured through conventional insurance or credit markets. 
However, a problem with index contracts is that an individual can suffer a loss 
and not be paid because the major event trigging a payment has not occurred.  For 
example, a farmer with rainfall insurance could lose his/her crop to drought at a micro-
location, but not receive an indemnity if the rainfall at the region’s weather station 
remains above the trigger point.  With index contracts it is also possible for an individual 
to be paid when they suffer no losses.  In futures markets, this type of risk is referred to as 
basis risk. Index contracts essentially tradeoff basis risks for transaction costs, and the 
insurance will not be attractive if the basis risk becomes too high.  
Individual decisions to purchase area-based index insurance can be analyzed 
through extensions of portfolio theory, including those evolving from Markowitz and 
capital asset pricing models, hedging models, and contingent claims models.  Index insurance 
becomes another asset in the individual’s portfolio.  In some cases, index insurance may improve 
the performance of the portfolio more than adding another activity (e.g. another crop in the 13 
 
case of a farmer who is trying to manage risk by diversifying), especially if better terms of 
credit are available when the insurance index is purchased.  
For a rainfall index, the degree of correlation between net receipts from the index 
and farm income will play a large role in the effectiveness of the risk protection offered to 
a farmer.  With higher correlation there will be less basis risk.  Understanding income-
rainfall correlation requires crop yield modeling.  Further, it is possible that a set of 
rainfall indexes may fit best for different farming systems.  Farm income risks for certain 
crops may be most sensitive to rainfall shortfalls at different times during the season (e.g. 
planting and blooming).  Income may also be at risk during harvest if there is excess rain. 
The specific design of the index contract will also have a bearing.  Models such as the 
capital asset pricing models (CAPM) can be used to determine the optimal level of these 
contracts once the income-rainfall relationships are understood (Miranda does this for an 
area yield contract).  One advantage of CAPM type models is they also help identify the 
independent risk and the covariate or systemic risk.  Having a high covariate risk 
improves the efficacy of an index insurance contract.  Therefore, index products are a bit 
different than traditional insurance in that the very presence of high levels of covariate 
risks improves their attractiveness. 
But the presence of high covariance risk is potentially troublesome for the insurer. 
When a payment is due, then all those who have purchased insurance against the regional 
index must be paid at the same time.  Moreover, if the insured risks in different regions 
are highly correlated, then the insurer faces the possibility of having to make huge 
payments in some years.  To hedge against this risk, the insurer can either diversify 
regionally by selecting indices and sites that are not highly (positively) correlated, or sell 14 
 
part of the risk to the international and financial markets either through reinsurance or the 
emerging markets for sharing catastrophic risk. We shall return to this issue later. 
RAINFALL INSURANCE CONTRACTS (RICS) 
Even though either area-yield or area-soil moisture indexes may be better 
contracts, rainfall insurance contracts (RICs) may be technically more feasible for most 
countries because of the existence of long data series at regional weather stations. 
Although excess rainfall insurance contracts have existed for years, drought rainfall 
contracts are relatively new.  Nonetheless, there is a growing interest in drought rainfall 
contracts among insurers and reinsurers.  Part of the reason for this interest is the growing 
weather derivative market in the US.  Temperature is now traded in the U.S., allowing 
energy companies to hedge against swings in revenue when there are extremely high or 
low temperatures (Dischel).  Some significant work has taken place by the World Bank in 
investigating rainfall contracts for Nicaragua.  Still, to our knowledge, there are no 
rainfall contracts in developing countries at present. 
The essential principle of rainfall insurance is that contracts are written against 
specific rainfall outcomes (e.g. drought or flood) recorded at a local weather station.  The 
rainfall outcomes should be defined at catastrophic levels and should be highly correlated 
with the value of regional agricultural production or income.  For example, an insured 
event might be that rainfall during the most critical month of the growing season falls 70 
percent below normal.  In years when the insured event occurs, all the people who 
purchased the insurance receive the same payment per unit of insurance. In all other 
years, no payments are made.  Such a zero/one contract could be very important for 15 
 
individual insured in areas that are subjected to large losses when rainfall drops below a 
certain level.  This design is easy to understand and should be offered to small growers. 
While there are many ways to design rainfall contracts, the simplest is to sell the 
insurance in standard SUCs.  The insurance would be sold on a full cost basis, and the 
price of the SUC is the premium.  The insurance must be sold before season-specific 
information about the insured risk becomes available.  This requires a purchasing 
deadline, after which new SUCs are not sold.  In some cases, the deadline may be as 
much as a full year ahead.  For example, emerging ENSO events can now be forecast up 
to 12 months ahead. 
Besides the zero/one contract, one can envision contracts that pay in layers.  For 
example if rainfall is between 40 and 60 percent of normal the insured might get a 
payment equal to 1/3; the next 1/3 would come if rainfall equaled 20 to 40 percent of 
normal; a full payment would come for rainfall below the 20 % of normal level.  Finally, 
a percentage contract could also be offered where payments would be calculated on the 
basis of percentage below a certain rainfall level (a strike rainfall).  The percentage would 
be multiplied by the protection (liability) purchased.  
The alternative designs should be based on the sophistication of the customer and 
the incentives and opportunities that might exist to manipulate the rainfall measures.  
When people know that the rainfall is close to trigger a full payment (for the zero/one) 
contract, they have more incentives to tamper with the rainfall measures.  Thus, a 
zero/one contract may require more monitoring, even though it is the simplest design.  
In principle, one might expect the private sector to take the initiative in 
developing rainfall insurance, but there are several setup problems that might require a 16 
 
public intervention to jump start activity in many developing countries.  Setting up the 
basic infrastructure to get started may be an important government activity.  Start up 
activities include a) the research costs of identifying key catastrophic rainfall events that 
correlate strongly with agricultural production and income in different types of rainfed 
agricultural regions; b) educating rural people about the value of rainfall insurance; c) 
ensuring secure rainfall stations; d) establishing an appropriate legal and regulatory 
framework for rainfall insurance; and e) underwriting the insurance in some way (perhaps 
through contingent loans) until a sufficient volume of business has been established that 
international reinsurers or banks are willing to come in and assume the underwriting role 
for themselves.  These roles need not be costly but could prove crucial in launching 
rainfall insurance.  But it is also important not to launch the insurance on a heavily 
subsidized basis, so as not to distort incentives for private insurers or farmers. 
Despite the promise of rainfall insurance, there are significant issues that must be 
resolved.  These are a) the need for secure rainfall measurements, b) the actuarial 
challenges that are present due to the El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO), and c) the 
covariate risk problem for the insurer mentioned earlier.  
SECURE RAINFALL MEASURES 
Secure and reliable rainfall measures are critical for all parties.  New technologies 
hold significant promise.  One company in the U.S. offers a rain gauge operated by a 
battery with a five-year life.  Tiny buckets trip the measuring device so that rainfall at .01 
of an inch can be recorded, but no rain is actually collected and stored.  By using a data 
jack with windows based software, a worker simply plugs into the rainfall-measuring 17 
 
device and downloads the data.  It is not necessary to take frequent readings; in fact 
intervals of up to a month are adequate.  A complete system of 50 such gauges, software 
and data jack cost about $240 each.  This is affordable and offers the opportunity to 
densely populate a region with rain gauges.  Such coverage would permit readings from 
several adjacent gauges to be averaged to provide more reliable point estimates for a 
region.  It would also reduce the danger of distorted readings should an individual tamper 
with a single gauge.  Security can be enhanced by placing the rain gauges on telephone 
poles with shields around them from below.    
EL NIÑO SOUTHERN OSCILLATION 
The actuarial soundness of the insurance could be undermined by the ENSO 
phenomenon that changes the probability of the insured events.  It may be necessary to 
adjust the cost of the insurance when an ENSO event is confirmed, although this would 
require sufficient lead-time between knowledge of the pending event and the time of 
selling insurance.  It might also be necessary to sell contracts a few years into the future 
before anyone has knowledge of the ENSO.  For example, RICs that cover individual 
years for three years into the future may need to be sold as a package.  The most 
troublesome aspect of ENSO events in some parts of the world is that they extend across 
multiple crop seasons.  Again, multiple year contracts can be used to address this issue.  
However, this problem is similar to the large loss problem created by the covariate risk.  
The covariate risk may have both a spatial and a temporal dimension, making it even 
more important to consider some of the new alternatives for sharing catastrophe risk. 18 
 
FINDING EFFICIENT AND AFFORDABLE MECHANISMS TO SHARE 
COVARIATE RISK 
Insurance is available for natural disaster risk in many developed economies. 
Homeowners can insure against damage from hurricanes and earthquakes.  These risks 
are clearly different than most insurable risk.  Unlike automobile insurance where the 
risks are largely independent, natural disaster risks are correlated with some low 
probability of very high losses as a widespread area is damaged by a single event.  This 
requires special arrangements to share these risks in the capital markets.  Primary insurers 
pass on certain levels of risk to an international reinsurance market (Miranda and 
Glauber; Cutler and Zeckhauser; Skees and Barnett).   
The simplest form of reinsurance is a stop loss where the primary insurer pays a 
premium to get protection if their losses exceed certain levels. Other forms of reinsurance 
are also common.  Quota-share arrangements involve simply sharing both premiums and 
indemnities.  If an insurance company has a book of business that is concentrated in a 
hurricane-prone area they would likely need such reinsurance.  Suppose they have $100 
million of property value insured with an average premium rate of 10 percent, then they 
would collect $10 million in premiums.  While this company may have financial reserves 
of say another $10 million to cover significant losses, they cannot cover losses beyond the 
combined $20 million level, or beyond a loss ratio of 2 (indemnities / premiums).  They 
may therefore decide to buy a stop loss where the reinsurer pays for all losses above the 
$20 million level. 
In writing such a stop loss, the reinsurer has an interesting problem – how does 
one rate a policy for a low probability, high-loss event?  While there are very 19 
 
sophisticated models to address this problem, most prudent reinsurers will load the risk 
premium to cover larger losses than have been experienced in the past simply as a 
precaution against unexpectedly large losses (Anderson; Hogarth and Kunreuther 1989, 
1992).  The reinsurer must also consider the possibility that a large loss will occur early 
on and before an adequate financial reserve has been built up.  Again, the premium is 
loaded to build these reserves quickly.  Reinsurers must also invest in monitoring and 
information systems to ensure that they are not cheated, and this increases transaction 
costs.  In the end, all of these costs must be summed together with the pure risk of the 
contract to develop a premium rate. 
 Premium Rate  =  Pure premium rate + Catastrophic Load + Reserve Load  
                  + Charge to cover transaction costs + Return on equity 
Premium rates quickly become expensive, and often exceed the expectations of 
decision-makers who tend to quickly forget the severity of their losses from natural 
disasters (Kunreuther and Slovic; Camerer and Kunreuther).  If premium rates are to be 
kept low, then significant efficiency gains are required in the reinsurance industry.  The 
most promising prospect is if large international reinsurers can spread risks around the 
world, so that what may be low-probability high catastrophic events for a small company 
become largely independent and diversifiable risks for the large reinsurer.   
Despite significant growth in the international reinsurance markets in recent years, 
reinsurance markets are still thin with few large international firms and limited capacity.  
Kunreuther, Stipp, and Froot review some of the problems with reinsurance markets.  
Reinsurers have short memories and, after a major catastrophe, reinsurance prices 
increase greatly or the reinsurer simply pulls out of the market.  This happened in Florida 20 
 
after Hurricane Andrew and in California after the Northridge earthquake.  State 
reinsurance pools were created in both Florida and California to offset these problems 
(Noonan; Jaffee and Russell). 
As an alternative to formal reinsurance, recent developments in global financial 
markets are making it increasingly feasible to use new financial instruments to spread 
covariate risks, like regional rainfall, more widely (Cole and Chiarenza; Doherty; Lamm; 
Skees 1999b; Skees and Barnett). For example,  “catastrophe” bonds offer innovative 
ways of packaging the risks assumed by a rainfall insurer to sell in the international 
financial markets.  “Catastrophe” bonds issued against rainfall events in developing 
countries could be very appealing to international investment bankers because their risk 
would be uncorrelated with the risks of most other financial investments. 
Since ENSO is a major source of risk, it might be possible to develop an 
exchange-traded index on ENSO in a major futures exchange market like the Chicago 
Board of Trade (CBOT).  There is also some promise that exchange markets can be used 
as risk-sharing institutions for disasters.  The Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) trades a 
Catastrophic Insurance Options Contract (CAT).  Property Claim Services (PCS) 
catastrophe loss indices are traded for nine geographic regions in the U.S.  As such, the 
contract allows those at risk from large property and causality losses due to hurricanes or 
earthquakes to share some of that risk with a larger community of traders in an exchange 
market.  The contract has grown a good deal in recent years but still comprises only about 
two percent of the total market.   
Skees and Barnett go further by proposing that governments could offer some 
very low-level index contracts to reinsurers to assure that adequate capital is forthcoming. 21 
 
Lewis and Murdock make a similar proposal for the U.S. government to offer excess of 
loss contracts to the private sector.  Since the insurer will likely load for events that have 
not happened yet, this may be important.  One way to facilitate this would be to have the 
government offer options on rainfall that is at the lowest level experienced in recent 
decades.  Primary insurers and reinsures would determine how many and what mix of 
such contracts to purchase from the government.  These contracts could be simply rated at 
the historical break-even rate, or they could be auctioned to the highest bidder.  The 
World Bank or others in the capital markets could back up these contracts with a 
contingency loan so that the government would have sufficient capital to pay all losses if 
the bad year came before an adequate reserve had been built up.  In effect, the capital 
markets would be offering a stop-loss type contract to the government. 
To clarify these principles, consider the following hypothetical scenario.  A 
primary insurance company decides to offer drought insurance contracts to farmers, 
bankers, and others for a limited test period in three weather stations areas.  For 
simplicity, assume that only one contract is available at each weather station, and the 
contract pays when cumulative rainfall in the months of May through July is less than 75 
percent of the average rainfall at the station.  If the rainfall is between 75 and 50 percent, 
the contract pays 1/3 the face value; if the rainfall is between 50 and 25 percent of the 
average, the contract pays 2/3s the face value; and if the rainfall is 25 percent or less of 
the average the contract pays the full face value. Assume that the primary insurer writes 
$1 million in premium for RICS.  If the face value were $10 million then, in the worst 
case, each rainfall station would have rainfall of less than 25 percent of average, and the insurer 
would pay $10 million.  It happens that for these three stations such an event has never occurred, 22 
 
at least not all at the same time.  However, that does not mean it could not happen in the future, 
and any prudent reinsurer would want to load the reinsurance premium to cover this possibility. 
This might make the reinsurance too expensive for the primary insurer.   
To counter this, the host-country government could offer to sell individual rainfall 
contracts to reinsurers.  For example, the government might sell a rainfall contract for 
each station that pays in two stages: 1) 50 percent of the face value for rainfall below 40 
percent of the average; and 2) 100 percent of the face value for rainfall below 20 percent 
of the average.  Reinsurers could then purchase a mixture of these contracts to best 
protect their risk, and this would reduce their need to load the premium for the primary 
insurer.  However, if the government sells these contracts, it must have the capital to pay 
if the bad year comes early.  This could be particularly difficult for small countries that 
have limited risk-pooling opportunities.  To address the small country problem, the World 
Bank, an international reinsurer, or a financial entity that is ready to write catastrophe 
bonds, could offer simple stop-loss coverage via a contingency loan.  For example, if the 
government sold premium of $500,000 for these contracts, at premium rates of 5 percent, 
the maximum possible loss would be 20 times the total premium, or $10 million. While 
the expectations are that the government would break-even over the long run, they could 
have serious losses if losses of this magnitude occurred early.  The World Bank or the 
international capital markets could cover such an event with a loan.  To initiate things, the 
government might want to offer these contracts in limited numbers through an auction to 
create an insurance market.  Or the government might be able to build a reserve fund and 
offer the contracts without outside capital after some time. The primary objective should 23 
 
be to move to a market-based system with little or no government involvement in 
reinsurance.  24 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
A market-based, risk-sharing insurance alternative for agriculture has many 
potential advantages.  The link between risk and credit markets is important.  If risks are 
not mitigated, then credit will be more expensive and less readily available. Credit is one 
key to development, as producers generally must borrow to invest in new technologies.  
Beyond the credit linkages, market-based insurance should reduce the burden on 
government budgets.  By making insurance available, the government may not have to 
provide free disaster aid.  Other efficiency gains should be expected as well as farmers 
may be more flexible in taking advantage of the benefits of specialization.  To the extent 
that market-based insurance can serve the risk management needs of the rural poor, it can 
also help redress important food security problems. 
While all of the potential benefits associated with offering crop insurance may be 
used to justify some level of government involvement, great care is needed. World 
experience has demonstrated that public efforts at delivering farm-level, multiple-peril 
crop insurance have been flawed.  The total public cost of these programs has far 
exceeded their public benefits.  These programs have proved far more costly than 
expected because a) they have been poorly designed to deal with basic insurance 
problems such as moral hazard and adverse selection, and b) they have suffered from 
poor management, high administration costs and exceptional losses arising from 
government interference in the form of open-ended financial support, restrictions on the 
insurance portfolio, and meddling in the payment of indemnities for political reasons. 
Searching for effective solutions requires both lower transaction costs and reduced 
opportunities for rent seeking.  The best way to reduce rent-seeking opportunities is to 25 
 
make the government’s role explicit and transparent, and not to change the rules when 
large losses occur. 
Our diagnosis of the problems with traditional crop insurance has led us to area-
based index insurance contracts.  Properly designed area-yield, rainfall, or soil moisture 
index insurance contracts require less monitoring to control adverse selection and moral 
hazard.  In addition, administrative costs should be low.  A variety of rural people could 
purchase area-index insurance contracts in addition to small-scale farmers.  They could 
also be sold in small units that might appeal to poor people.  Finally, creative forces 
within financial markets should be able to use index insurance contracts to handle 
covariate risk.  Wrap-around products that cover some additional risk are possible. 
Microfinance entities could use the contracts to handle major risk and offer better terms 
of credit.  Many possibilities exist for using this type of insurance to further develop 
markets for sharing risk  
Despite our enthusiasm for index insurance contracts, we recognize that some key 
issues must be addressed.  All parties must be confident that the measurement of what 
will trigger payments is secure and accurate.  The system of measurement must be free of 
any possibility of tampering.  There must also be confidence and transparency in the 
procedures used to develop premium rates.  Great care must be used in designing 
contracts that match what is at risk.  Marketing plans must be developed that address 
how, when, and where index contracts are to be sold.  Also, the government and other 
involved institutions must consider whether to facilitate and regulate secondary markets 
of exchange for the contracts.  Finally, reinsurance or effective and efficient use of other 26 
 
financial markets will be critical for sharing the covariate risk represented in index 
contracts.  These risks must be spread around the world to obtain the best pricing.  
Once properly constructed index contracts are in place, it should be possible to 
obtain efficient pricing in the international markets.  Governments can build the 
infrastructure for measuring the index and monitoring the information to add credibility.  
Governments may also become involved in selling very low options on the index in order 
to improve the pricing.  These options could be secured by contingency loans with an 
international bank (e.g., the World Bank).  Again, there are many possible evolutions in 
the market once an effective index contract is trading.  These developments should be 
oriented toward market-based insurance.  Governments should not engage in attempting 
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